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How the brain adjusts behavior in ever-changing envi-
ronments is an enduring mystery. Scientists have attrib-
uted adaptive and goal-directed behavior to executive 
control. This umbrella term is used for the functions of 
the cognitive system that allow people to regulate their 
behavior according to higher order goals or plans. This 
involves organizing, monitoring, and altering the settings 
of lower level cognitive processes such as stimulus detec-
tion and motor programming (Logan & Gordon, 2001; 
E.  K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Monsell & Driver, 2000; 
Norman & Shallice, 1986). These functions are critical in 
everyday life, as they allow people, for example, to resist 
temptations, overcome habits, or replace actions when 
required (e.g., when one is driving a car and a pedestrian 
unexpectedly crosses the street). More generally, execu-
tive control has been linked to physical and mental 
health, school and job success, substance dependence, 
personal finances, and many aspects of social behavior 
(Diamond, 2013; Moffitt et  al., 2011). Impairments in 
executive control may underlie many psychopathological 
disorders, including attention deficit/hyperactivity disor-
der (ADHD), substance abuse disorders, eating disorders, 
obsessive–compulsive behavior disorders, and gambling 
disorders (Bechara, Noel, & Crone, 2006; Crews & 
Boettiger, 2009; de Wit, 2009; Garavan & Stout, 2005; 
Nigg, 2001; Noël, Brevers, & Bechara, 2013). The out-
come of behavioral change interventions has also been 
linked to executive control (e.g., Nederkoorn, Jansen, 
Mulkens, & Jansen, 2007). Thus, it is no surprise that 
executive control is a central component of many neuro-
biological models of addictions and of impulsive and 
compulsive behaviors (Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2007; 
Crews & Boettiger, 2009; Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011; 
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Abstract
For centuries, human self-control has fascinated scientists and nonscientists alike. Current theories often attribute it to 
an executive control system. But even though executive control receives a great deal of attention across disciplines, 
most aspects of it are still poorly understood. Many theories rely on an ill-defined set of “homunculi” doing jobs like 
“response inhibition” or “updating” without explaining how they do so. Furthermore, it is not always appreciated 
that control takes place across different timescales. These two issues hamper major advances. Here we focus on the 
mechanistic basis for the executive control of actions. We propose that at the most basic level, action control depends 
on three cognitive processes: signal detection, action selection, and action execution. These processes are modulated 
via error-correction or outcome-evaluation mechanisms, preparation, and task rules maintained in working and long-
term memory. We also consider how executive control of actions becomes automatized with practice and how people 
develop a control network. Finally, we discuss how the application of this unified framework in clinical domains can 
increase our understanding of control deficits and provide a theoretical basis for the development of novel behavioral 
change interventions.
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Goldstein & Volkow, 2011; Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de Wit, 
& Ersche, 2012).
In this article, we critically assess the current state of 
the executive control literature and highlight some press-
ing issues. We propose a unified framework of executive 
control and describe how this framework can contribute 
to our understanding of behavioral change and to the 
development of new behavioral change interventions 
that target eating behavior, addiction, and self-control 
problems more generally. We focus on executive control 
of actions but also consider how this work could trans-
late to the control of thought and emotion.
An Army of Control Homunculi
Early research on executive control focused mostly on 
behavioral deficits after frontal-lobe lesions (for short 
reviews, see Miyake et al., 2000; Monsell & Driver, 2000). 
The common finding is that frontal-lobe patients experi-
ence problems with organizing and regulating actions; 
for example, they can become impulsive and are often 
unable to respond appropriately to changes in the envi-
ronment. Based on such findings, it was proposed that a 
critical function of the frontal cortex is executive control 
of action and thought. After the cognitive revolution 
against the behaviorists in the 1950s, the concept of an 
executive controller also became very prominent in the 
cognitive literature. However, in early models of cogni-
tion, control was essentially attributed to a unitary 
“homunculus” who pulls the levers to regulate lower 
level systems when needed (Baddeley, 1996). Around the 
turn of the 21st century, many psychologists agreed that 
this situation was no longer tenable, because homuncu-
lus theories may explain what is controlled but not how 
control is exercised.
The preferred strategy to tackle the “how” question 
became fractionating the executive controller and deter-
mining how distinct control functions regulate behavior. 
Monsell and Driver (2000) proposed the slogan “Dissolve, 
deconstruct, or fractionate, the executive! Let a hundred 
idiots flourish!” (p. 7). They argued that to know how 
control is exercised, we should identify the very basic 
processes (the “army of idiots”) that underlie control. In 
the last decade, great efforts have been made to decon-
struct the executive controller. For example, correlational 
work suggests that there is both unity and diversity in 
executive control, with at least three distinct executive 
functions: switching between tasks or mental sets (“shift-
ing”), changing and monitoring representations stored in 
working memory (“updating”), and suppressing irrele-
vant information and canceling inappropriate actions 
(“inhibition”) (Miyake et  al., 2000). Many studies have 
focused on the cognitive and neural substrates of these 
functions and how they interact with each other. 
Unfortunately, we believe that this work has not yet suc-
ceeded in banishing homunculus theories.
Too often, researchers label cognitive functions as 
“executive” without questioning the mechanistic nature 
of the underlying processes. For example, in clinical, 
social, and cognitive psychology, individual or group dif-
ferences in controlling actions are typically attributed to 
variation in the effectiveness of a single control function 
(e.g., inhibition). Similarly, in cognitive neuroscience, 
prefrontal brain activation, when people replace one 
response with another, is often assumed to reflect a form 
of executive control. However, the community seems to 
have fallen into the trap of confusing tasks with mecha-
nisms. Many processes contribute to successfully replac-
ing an action. By referring to general constructs such as 
“inhibition” (or, even worse, “executive control” or “self-
control”), we do not explain performance in complex 
environments—we merely redescribe it. Thus, although 
many researchers no longer appeal to a single control 
homunculus, control is often attributed to an ill-defined 
set of specialized “black-box” homunculi that are assumed 
to do jobs like “response inhibition” or “updating” with-
out explaining how they do so. We believe that this theo-
retical strategy of focusing on general functions rather 
than the underlying processes is limiting progress on the 
control problem, because in most cases, there are no 
clear explanations for how the specific functions are 
achieved.
Furthermore, many (if not most) studies focus on 
action control in response to changes in the environ-
ment. However, various processes that take place on dif-
ferent timescales may contribute to individual and 
situational differences in the efficacy of control. 
Preparation or preactivation of subordinate systems that 
are required to detect a specific stimulus (e.g., a red 
light), to select a specific response (e.g., hit the brake 
pedal), or to execute specific action (e.g., move the leg) 
could have a major influence; similarly, the ability to 
implement and maintain new rules may prove critical. 
Finally, action control may evolve over time. The dichoto-
mous distinction between “executive” and “automatic” 
processes is still omnipresent in the action control litera-
ture. Automatic processes are considered to be fast, asso-
ciative, emotional, effortless, and easily triggered by 
information in the environment, regardless of the current 
task goals. By contrast, executive processes are consid-
ered to be slower, effortful, rational, and goal directed. 
But these may be the extremes on a continuum, and con-
trol processes that start off as deliberate and effortful can 
become progressively more “automatic” through experi-
ence. By not properly acknowledging the contribution of 
processes such as preparation and learning, we generate 
an inherently limited perspective on the cognitive mech-
anisms behind action control.
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Our proposed solution for these interlinked issues is a 
comprehensive theoretical framework of action control 
and adaptive behavior that integrates research from dif-
ferent areas (see Fig. 1 for a schematic representation). 
We will focus not only on the functions of the cognitive 
control system but also on the underlying cognitive pro-
cesses. We define various forms of behavioral control as 
resulting from the interplay between three basic and 
computationally well-defined processes: signal detection, 
action selection, and action execution. Each process is 
monitored, and parameters are adjusted when the out-
come is suboptimal. Furthermore, preparation will 
directly affect the effectiveness of the selection and exe-
cution processes. Task rules, which have to be activated 
and maintained, will constrain the processes and adjust-
ments. Finally, we will outline how action control and 
behavioral change gradually becomes automatized 
through practice and, more generally, how a control sys-
tem can develop.
From Changes in the Environment to 
Changes in Behavior
Flexible behavior is often studied in tasks such as the stop-
signal paradigm (Logan, 1994; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008c), the psychological refractory period paradigm 
(Pashler, 1994; Welford, 1952), reversal learning paradigms 
(Izquierdo & Jentsch, 2012), Stroop tasks (Stroop, 1935), or 
in one of their many variants (e.g., Dodds, Morein-Zamir, 
& Robbins, 2011; Logan & Burkell, 1986; MacLeod, 1991; 
Mars, Piekema, Coles, Hulstijn, & Toni, 2007; Verbruggen, 
Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010). These tasks often have 
in common that a new action has to be selected in the 
context of other strong action plans (see Table 1 for a 
selective overview of key paradigms). Differences in 
dependent variables such as response latency and error 
rates are usually assumed to reflect variations in the effi-
cacy of control. For example, in most stop-signal task stud-
ies (including some of our own earlier work; e.g., 
Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2004), the 
stop-signal reaction time (Table 1) is assumed to reflect the 
duration of an executively controlled inhibition process. 
However, the stop-signal reaction time reflects more than 
the duration of an inhibitory process. Indeed, we have 
recently demonstrated how successful inhibition of actions 
depends on the detection of the stop signal and the selec-
tion of a stop response (Verbruggen et  al., 2010; 
Verbruggen, Stevens, & Chambers, 2014). In this section, 
we will further develop our framework of how humans 
can change actions in various situations. Drawing on the 
seminal work of Sternberg (1969) and others, we propose 
that at the most basic cognitive level, action control 
involves three steps: signal detection, action selection, and 
action execution (their application is illustrated in Fig. 2).
detection
selection
execution
proactive
control
rule activation 
and 
maintenance
associative
learning
development monitoring
seconds/millisecondsdays/hours/minutesyears/months
Fig. 1. A schematic overview of our framework, which is inspired by Newell’s Unified Theories of Cogni-
tion (Newell, 1990). We define various forms of behavioral control as an interplay between three basic 
and computationally well-defined processes (signal detection, action selection, and action execution), 
which are regulated and influenced by (sets of) processes that take place on different timescales: outcome 
monitoring, advance preparation, rule acquisition and maintenance, associative learning, and develop-
ment. We propose that the parameters of all three basic processes (detection, selection, execution) can 
be influenced by these other processes. In the main text, we discuss each “box” in more detail so as to 
avoid the introduction of new homunculi.
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Signal Detection
The first step of replacing a response is nearly always 
detecting the stop or change cue (e.g., a traffic light turn-
ing red or noticing an unexpected obstacle on the road). 
A failure to detect the signal in time could have important 
negative consequences. However, the contribution of 
detection processes to executive control of action is often 
neglected.
A convergence of evidence suggests that flexible 
behavior depends on an interplay between two attention 
networks: a dorsal frontoparietal network that enables the 
selection of sensory stimuli and a ventral frontoparietal 
Table 1. Overview of Popular Paradigms to Study Action Control and Behavioral Flexibility
Task name Manipulation Main dependent variable(s)
Stop-signal task Participants usually perform a choice reaction time in which they have 
to respond as quickly as possible to a particular stimulus feature 
(e.g., color, shape, identity, or location). On a minority of the trials, 
the go stimulus is followed by an additional signal (e.g., an auditory 
tone or a visual cue), which instructs participants to withhold their 
planned response.
In the countermanding task, participants have to cancel a saccade 
toward a target when a fixation cross reappears. In the stop-change 
variant, participants have to cancel the planned manual response and 
execute an alternative response instead.
The stop-signal reaction time (SSRT), 
which is the estimated covert latency 
of stopping (Logan & Cowan, 1984). 
Longer SSRTs are usually interpreted 
to reflect poorer inhibitory control.
Go/no-go task Participants are instructed to respond as quickly as possible to go 
stimuli (e.g., letters) but to refrain from responding when a no-go 
stimulus is presented (e.g., a digit). Go events typically occur with 
higher frequency than no-go events.
The probability of responding on a 
no-go trial.
Psychological 
refractory period 
(PRP) task
Participants are presented with two stimuli to which they have to 
respond. The interval between the two is usually so brief that the 
second stimulus appears before the response to the first one is 
finished.
Response latency of the second 
response (RT2), often as a function 
of the delay between the two stimuli 
(SOA). The PRP effect refers to the 
decrease in RT2 as SOA increases.
Stroop task and 
variants
In the Stroop task, color words are presented in various ink colors. 
Participants are instructed to respond to the ink color and ignore 
the words. In incongruent stimuli, color names and ink colors are 
non-matching. Related tasks include the picture-word naming task, in 
which words appear inside pictures of objects.
The congruency effect, which refers to 
the difference between incongruent 
and congruent or neutral (e.g., 
“OOO” written in red) stimuli.
The Eriksen 
flanker task
A task in which participants view target stimuli to which they must 
make a simple lexical response. These stimuli are surrounded by 
flankers. Distracting flankers are typically associated with an opposite 
response (incongruent), whereas facilitating flankers are typically 
associated with the same response as the target stimulus (congruent).
The congruency effect, which refers to 
the difference between incongruent 
and congruent items.
Task-switching 
paradigm
Participants frequently alternate between two or more tasks (e.g., 
naming the color or identifying the shape of a stimulus). Which 
task they have to perform is often indicated by a cue (e.g., the task 
name or the location of the stimulus) or by a sequence they have to 
remember.
The difference between task-switch 
trials and task-repeat trials. Usually, 
switching from one task to another 
is slower and more error-prone than 
repeating the same task.
(Wisconsin) Card 
Sorting Test
The participant is presented with stimulus cards containing shapes. 
The cards differ in color of the shapes, number of the shapes, and 
the form of the shapes. The participant is asked to sort these cards 
into two piles. The participant is not told what stimulus dimension 
to use in order to sort the cards, but feedback is provided to tell the 
participant if a particular match is correct. During the test, the sorting 
rules are changed and the participant must discover the new sorting 
rule in order to be successful.
The total number of categories 
achieved and the number of 
perseveration errors after a rule 
switch.
Response-reversal 
learning
Participants first learn to respond to stimuli based on feedback, 
followed by a reversal of the stimulus-action mapping. Participants 
have to overcome the old (habitual) response, and instead, execute 
an alternative novel response.
Proportion of correct responses before 
and after the reversal stage.
Note: Definitions are based on the Cognitive Atlas project (Poldrack et al., 2011). For more information about this project and other tasks, 
visit http://www.cognitiveatlas.org/. Note that this project also aims to increase the focus on the underlying processes. SOA = stimulus onset 
asynchrony.
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network that reorients attention to important and behav-
iorally relevant stimuli that appear outside the focus of 
attention (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002). The dorsal attention network is thought 
to be involved in both stimulus-driven capture (bottom-
up) and goal-directed processing (top-down; Corbetta 
et al., 2008). Precisely how these modes interact is still 
intensely debated (e.g., see Theeuwes, 2010, and associ-
ated commentaries). The ventral attention network is 
believed to be critical for behavioral flexibility as it allows 
reorienting attention from one stimulus or task toward 
another. Even though this network is primarily involved in 
stimulus-driven attention, it is activated more by weak 
behaviorally relevant stimuli than by salient behaviorally 
irrelevant stimuli (Corbetta et al., 2008). This suggests that 
the detection of novel signals is constrained or biased by 
top-down control mechanisms. For example, target 
detection could be controlled by an attentional template 
(a representation of the relevant target or target features, 
such as a red circle) that biases competition between sen-
sory inputs that compete for processing resources and 
control of behavior (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 
2006). Computational work has shown how the templates 
could influence processing in both ventral and dorsal 
streams (Deco & Rolls, 2005). Preactivation of neurons in 
sensory areas that code for specific stimulus features (e.g., 
location, color, shape) could be the neural implementa-
tion of the templates (Deco & Rolls, 2005; Stokes & 
Duncan, 2013).
We believe that the literature on attention should 
become more integrated with the action-control literature. 
After all, signal detection is an important component of 
executive control of action: If changes in the environment 
are not detected quickly, this will have robust downstream 
effects on action control, as experimentally demonstrated 
in a recent stop-signal study (Verbruggen et  al., 2014). 
Salinas and Stanford (2013) demonstrated that counter-
manding (i.e., canceling or stopping) eye movements pri-
marily depends on the outcome of a rapid sensory 
detection process (see also Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & 
Schall, 2007). On the basis of their computational work, 
they suggested that most manipulations in the counter-
manding task, which requires subjects to cancel eye 
movements (Table 1), cause changes in perceptual pro-
cesses rather than inhibitory processes per se. The role of 
stimulus-detection or cue-encoding processes goes 
beyond action-reprogramming paradigms such as the 
countermanding task. Some models of interference con-
trol in paradigms such as the Eriksen flanker task (Table 
1) focus on the role of spatial attention (e.g., J. D. Cohen, 
Servan-Schreiber, & McClelland, 1992). In the task-switch-
ing literature (Table 1), authors have argued that the cost 
associated with alternating between tasks is at least partly 
due to cue-encoding processes (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; 
Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Consistent with this idea, rule-
switch performance in a card-sorting task in children was 
improved when the relevant stimulus dimensions were 
salient, suggesting a bottom-up attentional influence on 
flexible behavior (Fisher, 2011).
Thus, we suggest that rapid detection of cues or 
changes in the environment is key to replacing planned 
or ongoing actions and that at least some individual or 
situational differences in action control can be attributed 
to the efficacy of stimulus detection. Although signal 
detection may seem effortless, it does require a delicate 
balance between selective attention and change detec-
tion: Focusing on a given stimulus may lead to overly 
rigid behavior while the constant reorienting of attention 
to novel stimuli would lead to constant distraction 
(Verbruggen et al., 2014).
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Fig. 2. Action selection without a homunculus. We propose that action 
control involves three critical steps: signal detection, action selection, 
and action execution. We propose that both detection and selection 
can be modeled as accumulation of information toward a threshold (the 
dashed horizontal line). When stimuli are presented (in this example, 
the crisps and carrot), accumulation in the perceptual system starts, 
and a stimulus is perceptually encoded and attended (signal detec-
tion) when the evidence reaches a certain threshold. When an item 
is encoded, evidence for possible actions starts to accumulate (action 
selection), and a response is selected when one of the thresholds is 
reached. Then this response is executed. In this example, the “eat the 
carrot” threshold is reached first, so the person would eat the carrot. 
Note that for simplicity, we depict linear ballistic accumulators (S. D. 
Brown & Heathcote, 2008).
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Action Selection
When a change signal or cue is detected, an appropriate 
alternative action has to be selected. Sequential sampling 
models have provided a popular theoretical framework 
for action selection and decision making because they 
explicate the various steps involved (S. D. Brown & 
Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & Ratcliff, 
2004). The main assumption of these models is that 
action selection and decision making involve the accu-
mulation of noisy information about stimuli in the envi-
ronment (Fig. 2). Noise is present both in the environment 
(e.g., visibility may be reduced or the environment may 
be cluttered) and in the cognitive system (e.g., neurons 
may fire randomly, and different processes may be hap-
pening at the same time), so decision making involves 
collecting evidence until there is enough support for an 
option. More formally, accumulation of information in 
response counters, which keep track of the collected evi-
dence, starts when a stimulus is detected.1 In each situa-
tion, there may be different response options; one of 
them is selected when the accumulated evidence in favor 
of it reaches a certain threshold (Fig. 2). This response 
option is then executed. The more noisy the information 
(e.g., because the stimulus is perceptually degraded), the 
longer it will take to reach the threshold. This will result 
in longer reaction times and, often, lower accuracy. This 
accumulation to threshold may resemble patterns of 
activity in certain neurons (Purcell et al., 2010; X.-J. Wang, 
2013). The main parameters of the selection process are 
the response criteria (i.e., how much information is 
required for a response to be selected; this is represented 
by the distance between the horizontal lines in Fig. 2) 
and accumulation rate (i.e., how quickly does the infor-
mation accumulate; this is represented by the slope of 
the tilted lines in Fig. 2). Variations in these parameters 
can account for phenomena such as impulsive decision 
making and choice errors (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith & 
Ratcliff, 2004), and sequential sampling models have 
been successfully applied to a range of decision-making 
tasks and to different clinical and nonclinical populations 
(White, Ratcliff, Vasey, & McKoon, 2010).
These sequential sampling models have been applied 
mostly to simple decision-making tasks in which subjects 
have to select a single response. But we propose that 
similar principles underlie the selection of actions in the 
context of stopping, countermanding, or replacing 
actions. Sequential sampling models have already been 
applied successfully to countermanding (Boucher, 
Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007; Salinas & Stanford, 2013) 
and stop-signal tasks (Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & 
Wagenmakers, 2014). Boucher et  al.’s (2007) model 
included a single go accumulator and a single stop accu-
mulator, with two processing stages, namely, encoding of 
the countermanding signal and interruption of the go 
process. An eye movement was successfully counter-
manded if stop information had accumulated quickly 
enough to suppress (via mutual inhibitory connections) 
information in the go unit and prevent it from reaching a 
threshold. Salinas and Stanford (2013) developed a simi-
lar rise-to-threshold model but did not make any mecha-
nistic assumptions about inhibitory activity; as mentioned 
above, they showed that perceptual processes and decel-
eration of information accumulation was sufficient to 
account for many aspects of performance. These two 
models had only one go accumulator. More recently, a 
sampling model with multiple go accumulators and a 
single stop accumulator has been developed to account 
for stopping in situations in which multiple go responses 
are possible (Logan et  al., 2014). This model could 
account well for both go (choice) and stop behavior.
In the context of behavioral change, alternative actions 
must often be selected in competition with more domi-
nant or already activated actions. Existing models could 
easily be modified to account for this. It has been pro-
posed that there may be an asymmetry in mutual inhibi-
tion of units (Boucher et al., 2007) or top-down biasing 
of response options ( J. D. Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 
1990). More specifically, the mutual inhibition account 
assumes that different response options suppress each 
other. In Figure 2, when evidence for the carrot option 
accumulates, this would suppress accumulation of evi-
dence for the crisps option. Boucher et al. (2007) sug-
gested that there may be an asymmetry in mutual 
inhibition, so that one response option (e.g., the carrot) 
may suppress the other response option (e.g., the crisp) 
more. The biasing account assumes that information 
accumulation is biased (e.g., by decreasing the distance 
between the starting point and the threshold; see Fig. 2), 
making the selection of certain alternatives more likely. 
Others have proposed that selection of nondominant 
actions is achieved by global suppression of all motor 
output to allow for information accumulation in the 
counter of the nondominant action (Frank, 2006; Wiecki 
& Frank, 2013). The global suppression account overlaps 
with the “circuit breaker” account of attention, which 
proposes that when unexpected, salient signals are 
detected, ongoing processes are interrupted by default to 
allow the cognitive system to process the new incoming 
information (Corbetta et al., 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002).
The computational work suggests that similar selection 
mechanisms may be used in various situations. Cognitive 
neuroscience studies further support this idea. Mid-
dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal areas are recruited 
by tasks that require selection of competing actions 
(Bunge, 2004; Duncan & Owen, 2000), and stimulation of 
these areas influences action selection in different 
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situations. We have found that magnetic stimulation of 
subregions within the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
can influence attentional and action selection not only in 
a stop-signal task but also in a double-response task in 
which participants occasionally had to execute a second-
ary response in addition to the originally planned response 
(Verbruggen et al., 2010). Similarly, Buch and colleagues 
demonstrated that stimulation of the ventral premotor 
cortex (adjacent to the posterior ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex) influenced both selection and reprogramming of 
actions: Immediately after presentation of the initial stim-
ulus, stimulation of this area increased motor cortex excit-
ability; however, the same stimulation reduced motor 
excitability when reprogramming was required (Buch, 
Mars, Boorman, & Rushworth, 2010). This context-depen-
dent effect of brain stimulation is consistent with the idea 
that similar mechanisms are involved in both program-
ming and reprogramming actions, with the main differ-
ence being the output of the selection process (see also 
Mars et al., 2007). On the basis of these and similar find-
ings, we propose that various forms of action control not 
only serve the common goal of behavioral change, they 
also rely on an overlapping set of selection processes (see 
also Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008).
More generally, we propose that action selection and 
stimulus detection are governed by similar principles. 
The biased competition account of visual attention 
assumes that there is competition between sources of 
information at many (if not all) processing stages; the 
main role of attention is to resolve this competition by 
biasing specific sources of information or specific fea-
tures (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Similar top-down bias 
signals can resolve competition between action options 
or allow the selection of nondominant actions (see also 
Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011).
Action Execution
When a response is selected or a decision has been 
made, the appropriate action must be executed. There 
can be a relatively long delay between choosing (or 
deciding) and acting (Schall, 2001) because a motor pro-
gram has to be created when an action is selected. Keele 
defined a motor program as “a set of muscle commands 
that are structured before a movement sequence begins, 
and that allows the entire sequence to be carried out 
uninfluenced by peripheral feedback” (Keele, 1968, p. 
387). Creating such programs after an action is selected 
may contribute to the delay between choosing and act-
ing. Consequently, the execution phase could be a final 
stage where individual or situational differences in action 
control arise. Motor control is a research area in itself, 
and we will not attempt to review this literature here. We 
will focus briefly only on three topics that are closely 
linked to executive control, namely, the extent to which 
motor programs can be altered or canceled once initi-
ated, how they are controlled after the action is executed, 
and how the motor system interacts with the cognitive 
system.
If a motor program contains all the information needed 
to carry out the action, no extra control is required to 
complete the desired movement. This does not imply 
that movements can no longer be altered. In the literature 
on action control, researchers often make a distinction 
between controlled stages, which could be influenced by 
executive control, and ballistic stages, which must run to 
completion once initiated. The boundary between these 
two stages is called the “point-of-no-return.” The stop-
signal literature suggests that the ballistic stages must be 
very brief (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). This idea is sup-
ported by both mathematical analyses and studies that 
have showed that subjects could still inhibit responses 
that had already produced electrical activity in muscles 
(see Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b, for a review). Thus, 
movements can be prepared without being executed 
(Schall, 2001). Not only can planned movements be can-
celed, they can also be adjusted quickly if needed (e.g., 
Schmitz, Jenmalm, Ehrsson, & Forssberg, 2005). Thus, 
motor programs can still be terminated or altered quickly 
if new information becomes available.
Once the action has been completed, a “reset” signal 
may be required to restart evidence-accumulation pro-
cesses and suppress motor activity to prevent the reexe-
cution of the same response. Indeed, in many 
computational models, such a reset is required to stop 
the system settling into a loop. In Logan and Gordon’s 
executive control of theory of visual attention model, the 
executive system was responsible for this reset signal 
(Logan & Gordon, 2001). Note that there may be an over-
lap with the proactive suppression account discussed 
below, which proposes that people suppress motor activ-
ity to prevent premature responses.
In our framework, action execution is preceded by 
signal detection and action selection processes. This does 
not imply that action execution cannot interact with the 
preceding stages. First, an action can “create” a signal for 
the next decision. To achieve certain goals, multiple 
movements may be required. In some situations, these 
movements could be “chunked” or combined during the 
decision stage, when different options are selected simul-
taneously. But chunking may not always be possible (or 
preferable), so after each individual movement is com-
pleted, a new decision is required based on the imposed 
changes in the environment. This process would con-
tinue until the desired state or goal is achieved (G. A. 
Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). Second, the dual-task 
literature suggests that output modality has a direct influ-
ence on the decisional phase. Huestegge and Koch 
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(2013) showed that saccades were prioritized over man-
ual responses when participants had to make two deci-
sions at the same time. This response-modality dominance 
pattern could be the equivalent of the visual-modality 
dominance pattern observed at the stimulus stage (i.e., 
visual modality often dominates the auditory modality 
when different stimuli are presented; see Huestegge & 
Koch, 2013). The combination of input and output 
modalities also influences task performance in dual-task 
situations (for a short review, see Huestegge & Hazeltine, 
2011). For example, the dual-task cost, which is often 
observed in multitask situations (Table 1), disappears 
after sufficient practice for some input–output combina-
tions (e.g., an auditory input and a vocal output) but not 
for others (e.g., visual input and vocal output). This sug-
gests that selecting an action is influenced not only by 
the input but also by the output and the input–output 
pairing. More generally, this shows that there may be a 
close link between the cognitive and motor systems, 
which goes beyond the cognitive system instructing the 
motor system which actions to perform.
Interim key points
x Researchers should provide a more detailed 
account of action control because the current focus 
on general functions hampers theoretical and prac-
tical progress.
x We propose a framework that describes three cog-
nitive processes underlying most forms of action 
control: signal detection, action selection, and 
action execution. Each process can be conceived 
as a biased competition between alternatives.
x Individual or situational differences can arise at 
each stage, which further highlights the need for a 
detailed framework.
Beyond online action control
We have outlined the core of our framework and have 
illustrated how replacing an action depends on the 
detection of change signals, selection of an action, and 
the execution of that action. The detection and selection 
stages involve a biased competition between sources of 
information and response alternatives. In the following 
sections, we will focus on how these biases are continu-
ously adjusted by processes that take place across dif-
ferent timescales. We propose that detection, selection, 
and execution are influenced by monitoring, prepara-
tion, task rules maintained in memory, associative learn-
ing, and developmental changes (Fig. 1). Combined, 
these processes lead to flexible and highly adaptive 
behavior. In Figure 1, each component is depicted by a 
box. In the following sections, we will further unpack 
each box, creating our “army of idiots” (Monsell & 
Driver, 2000).
Learning From Mistakes or Unexpected 
Outcomes
Many things can go wrong when people try to execute a 
novel action. People may confuse stimuli at the detection 
stage, they may select the incorrect response, or they may 
execute the selected response incorrectly. Even when no 
mistakes are made, the outcome of an action may be less 
desirable than anticipated. Monitoring and feedback 
loops are a critical component of most accounts of coor-
dinated behavior (Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 
2014). Within the executive control and decision-making 
literature, there are several detailed neurocomputational 
models of outcome monitoring that aim to explain how 
outcome monitoring influences subsequent detection, 
selection, and execution processes. Three popular classes 
of explanation are the conflict-monitoring, error-monitor-
ing, and outcome-evaluation accounts.
Conflict and error monitoring versus 
outcome evaluation
The conflict-monitoring account of Botvinick and col-
leagues (Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
& Cohen, 2001) assumes that the anterior cingulate cor-
tex, a brain area located in the medial frontal cortex, 
monitors for the occurrence of conflict between various 
response options. This brain region is often activated in 
situations in which prepotent responses have to be sup-
pressed, situations in which one out of many possible 
but equally strong actions must be selected, situations in 
which errors are likely to occur, and situations with unfa-
vorable outcomes. On the basis of these findings, 
Botvinick et al. (2001) proposed that the anterior cingu-
late cortex computes a “conflict signal.” Conflict can be 
defined computationally as the simultaneous activation 
of incompatible stimulus (Egner, 2008; Verbruggen, 
Notebaert, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2006) or 
response representations (Botvinick et al., 2001). When a 
conflict signal is generated, task-relevant attentional or 
action pathways are biased, reducing the likelihood of 
errors or conflict on subsequent trials (Botvinick, 2007; 
Botvinick et al., 2001). For example, Egner and Hirsch 
(2005) examined control adjustments in a picture–word 
Stroop task. On each trial, an irrelevant word was super-
imposed on a task-relevant face. They found that activa-
tion in the fusiform face area, a brain area that responds 
strongly to face stimuli, was increased after trials on 
which there was competition between the face and word 
stimuli. This is consistent with the idea that conflict-mon-
itoring processes bias the competition between various 
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sources of information, enhancing detection of task-rele-
vant stimuli and selection of task-appropriate responses.
Others have stressed the role of anterior cingulate cor-
tex in error-driven learning and computing the likelihood 
of errors ( J. W. Brown & Braver, 2005). Brown and Braver 
showed how variability in a single error-learning param-
eter could account for individual differences in risk aver-
sion and in the brain’s response to response conflict, 
error likelihood, or error consequences ( J. W. Brown & 
Braver, 2008). Despite the differences, the conflict- and 
error-monitoring accounts stress that a critical aspect of 
optimal action control is the ability to monitor ongoing 
cognitive processes.
Outcome-evaluation models in the decision-making 
and reinforcement-learning literature assume that actions 
can be associated with a value, which represents a pre-
diction concerning future reward. After every action, the 
cognitive system compares the obtained reward with the 
expected reward. After reward is obtained, the action val-
ues are updated: When the reward or outcome is better 
than expected, the strength of the selected action is 
strengthened (“reinforced”); when the outcome is worse 
than expected, the value is decreased, and the action is 
less likely to be selected again in similar future situations 
(e.g., Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009; Frank & Badre, 2012). 
In other words, outcome-evaluation modulates action-
selection biases, and this will influence how quickly 
information for the preferred response option will accu-
mulate and reach the decision threshold. Some have 
argued that value can be attached to sources of informa-
tion as well, influencing stimulus-detection processes 
(Gottlieb & Balan, 2010). Note that outcome evaluation 
and conflict and error monitoring could be two sides of 
the same coin (Botvinick, 2007). Indeed, conflict or 
choice errors could be construed as aversive events, 
which are therefore to be avoided in the future (Botvinick, 
2007), and activation of the anterior cingulate cortex has 
been linked to encoding the relationship between an 
action and the reinforcement value of its outcome 
(Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004, p. 
412). Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, and Nieuwenhuis 
(2004) suggested that a single mechanism that signals the 
likelihood of obtaining a reward could account for many 
findings in the reward-learning and conflict- or error-
detection literature.
Interim key points
x Adaptive behavior requires monitoring or evaluat-
ing the outcome of actions.
x Detection, selection, and execution biases are con-
tinuously adjusted as a result of the monitoring 
process. This will determine how quickly a stimu-
lus is detected and how quickly an action is 
selected or executed in the future.
Proactive Action Control
The work discussed so far may suggest that executive 
control is primarily reactive: It is only when something 
changes or when something goes wrong that the control 
system would kick in. However, in many situations, we 
do not wait for unexpected events to happen. Indeed, we 
can adjust our behavior proactively. In contrast to the 
online or reactive control processes discussed above, 
proactive control refers to control processes in anticipa-
tion of an event. Proactive control can involve many 
things, including preparing oneself to detect a stimulus 
or cue, activating specific action plans, temporarily 
adjusting decision thresholds, and suppressing motor 
output to prevent premature responses (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009c; Verbruggen et  al, 2014). Thus, the three 
basic components of our framework may be influenced 
by preparation.
Proactive adjustments of task settings
Humans can proactively allocate attention. For example, 
in the classic Posner cuing paradigm (Posner, 1980), 
detection of a stimulus is enhanced by providing a cen-
tral cue (e.g., an arrow) that directs attention to a specific 
location (e.g., the left of the screen). This has been linked 
to anticipatory activity in the visual cortex (Kastner & 
Ungerleider, 2000; Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 
1997; Sylvester, Shulman, Jack, & Corbetta, 2007). 
Detection of stimuli or cues may also be enhanced by 
advance information of other features, such as shape, 
color, or direction of motion (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). 
Nonspatial preparatory attention is also associated with 
sustained activity in sensory areas (Chelazzi, Duncan, 
Miller, & Desimone, 1998). Such an increase in baseline 
activity will lead to an increased probability that the sys-
tem will select the stimulus that matches the attentional 
template. Thus, proactively adjusting attentional settings 
can enhance detection of task-relevant features (espe-
cially when perceptual information is weak) and reduce 
interference caused by no-longer-relevant features 
(Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). Consistent with the latter 
idea, we have demonstrated that goal-directed cueing of 
the target location reduced the effect of distractors that 
flanked a target (Klemen, Verbruggen, Skelton, & 
Chambers, 2011).
Proactive action selection or movement preparation is 
also possible. For example, studies using a precuing pro-
cedure demonstrated that individual motor actions or 
sets of actions can be prepared or primed in advance 
(Rosenbaum, 1980; Rosenbaum & Kornblum, 1982). This 
could reduce the time required to create motor programs. 
Similar to attentional cueing effects, motor priming may 
be linked to anticipatory activation of the motor network 
via associations between the cue and action options. This 
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will bias the selection and generally reduce the response 
time when a stimulus is presented (Meyer & Kieras, 
1997). Consistent with this biased selection idea, compu-
tational modeling has shown that cuing the probability of 
a response or the potential payoff for a specific response 
reduces the amount of information required to select the 
more probable response or the response associated with 
higher reward (Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & 
Forstmann, 2012). Priming of a nonhabitual response 
could also increase the probability of selecting this action 
in the context of other more habitual actions or when 
little information is available. Note that in some situations 
people may proactively suppress a specific action or set 
of actions to prevent the premature execution of a 
response (Cai, Oldenkamp, & Aron, 2011; Claffey, 
Sheldon, Stinear, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Criaud, 
Wardak, Ben Hamed, Ballanger, & Boulinguez, 2012; 
Duque, Labruna, Verset, Olivier, & Ivry, 2012). 
Computational work by Lo and colleagues suggests that 
in a countermanding task, the stopping network is acti-
vated even when no stop signal is presented (Lo, Boucher, 
Paré, Schall, & Wang, 2009). Thus, inhibitory motor con-
trol in stop-signal and countermanding tasks may be 
largely proactive in nature because it depends on control 
adjustments and network dynamics before a stop signal 
is presented (see also X.-J. Wang, 2013, p. 238).
Action control as a prepared reflex
Proactive control could potentially lead to a prepared or 
intention-based reflex. Some years ago, the second 
author was planning to turn into a road on his bike. A car 
was waiting to turn into the same road on the opposite 
side of the street the author was traveling along. The 
author had priority, as the car would cut across his path, 
and he made a clear signal with his extended arm just 
before he was about to turn. Unexpectedly, the car then 
immediately executed its maneuver, with the result that it 
knocked the author off his bike as he went around the 
corner. Why did this happen? We propose that when 
attention is proactively allocated and responses are pre-
pared, goal-directed actions may not require much con-
trol anymore (Hommel, 2000; Logan, 1978; Meiran, Cole, 
& Braver, 2012); instead, actions could be activated easily 
by stimuli in the environment, even when they are inap-
propriate. Thus, when the car driver had prepared the 
response of turning to a high degree, the author’s signal 
with his arm may have further primed the prepared reflex 
to the point where it exceeded threshold and was imple-
mented as an action.2
Logan (1978) demonstrated in a series of experiments 
that most stages in a visual-search task (including detec-
tion and response selection) remained relatively unaf-
fected by a concurrent load. He concluded that the 
preparation before the stimulus appeared was effortful, 
but responding was reflexive: “the components of the task 
seem automatic, but the task itself is not” (Logan, 1978, 
p. 57). Similarly, Woodman, Luck, and Schall (2007) dem-
onstrated that a visual working-memory load interfered 
with visual search only when the visual target changed 
from trial to trial. These findings suggest that stimulus 
detection, response selection, and execution may require 
little extra top-down support when correct task rules are 
properly activated. Furthermore, studies that have demon-
strated that the preparation can even interfere with task-
relevant or appropriate behavior (see also the bicycle 
anecdote) provide further support for the prepared reflex 
idea. Subjects are more likely to shift spatial attention to a 
task-irrelevant distractor when it matches a feature of the 
attentional template (Chun et  al., 2011). Similarly, 
responses can be activated via instructed but unpracticed 
stimulus–response mappings even when these mappings 
are task irrelevant (Cohen-Kdoshay & Meiran, 2009); how-
ever, such effects are observed only when the tasks are 
actually prepared and participants anticipate that they 
have to perform them in the near future (Liefooghe, De 
Houwer, & Wenke, 2013). Finally, Verbruggen and Logan 
(2009a) found that the irrelevant distractor “STOP” inside 
a go stimulus interfered with responding in stop-signal 
and go/no-go tasks but not in a task where participants 
could always respond. (These findings are consistent with 
the prepared reflex idea: The prepared action can be trig-
gered by irrelevant primes, even when this is not strictly 
required; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a.)
Costs of proactive control and 
individual differences
Combined, this work suggests that action control could be 
reflexive; paradoxically, this could even lead to a cost in 
some situations. But usually the main costs associated 
with proactive control are that this strategy requires highly 
reliable predictive contextual cues, it is metabolically 
costly, and it is capacity demanding (Braver et al., 2007). 
Humans usually prefer to avoid cognitive demands (Kool, 
McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010), so internal costs may 
shift the balance between reactive and proactive control 
(McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). This also implies that a pro-
active strategy is less likely to be applied in situations with 
very long retention intervals between a warning cue and 
the stimulus, as this may require too much effort. Finally, 
strong preactivation of stimulus features or actions may 
also stand in the way of flexible behavior in ever- changing 
environments. Thus, a delicate balance between proactive 
and reactive control is required.
The costs associated with proactive control could 
potentially explain some individual and situational varia-
tion. Differences in motivation (Leotti & Wager, 2010) and 
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emotional factors (Fröber & Dreisbach, 2012) contribute 
to intraindividual differences in deployment of proactive 
control, and factors such as reward sensitivity, general 
intelligence, and working-memory capacity may cause 
interindividual differences (Braver, 2012; Redick & Engle, 
2011). Several studies have also shown group differences. 
Healthy young adults seem to rely more on proactive 
control than both young children (Munakata, Snyder, & 
Chatham, 2012) and older adults (Paxton, Barch, Racine, 
& Braver, 2008), and proactive control seems impaired in 
disorders such as schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s disease, 
ADHD, and bipolar disorder (for review, see Braver, 
2012) and in individuals who engage in delinquent and 
antisocial behaviors (Iselin & Decoster, 2009). These find-
ings suggest that at least some control deficits could be 
due to a failure to activate the control system proactively. 
One study revealed the interesting finding that training 
older adults on a proactive control task caused a shift 
from reactive to proactive control (Braver, Paxton, Locke, 
& Barch, 2009), suggesting that control strategies are 
amendable.
Interim key points
x Executive control of actions is often proactive: The 
act of control takes place before the change or 
control signal is presented.
x When control is applied proactively, signal detec-
tion, action selection, and action execution can 
become a “prepared” reflex, easily triggered by 
information in the environment.
x Important intra- and interindividual differences 
could be due to shifts from proactive to reactive 
control.
Activation and Maintenance of Action 
Goals and Rules
An important issue that we have not addressed so far is 
how the connections between input, action selection, 
and action execution are established. And how does the 
cognitive system “know” which stimulus feature or 
response option to bias? The main important advance of 
the (mathematical) modeling framework discussed above 
is that ongoing processes are described in detail. However, 
there is still a homunculus lurking: because it is the 
researcher who creates all the connections and sets up 
the relevant accumulators that enable a model to perform 
a certain task. Thus, this framework does not necessarily 
solve the problem of how the model could achieve this 
functionality in the first place. Most theoretical frame-
works or models of executive control, including our 
framework, either explicitly or implicitly rely on rules 
(Bunge, 2004; Logan & Gordon, 2001; E. K. Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Monsell & Driver, 2000). Rules enable 
humans to quickly select relevant cues or stimulus fea-
tures, map sensory input to action plans, and produce 
the motor output. Furthermore, sequential adjustments 
after a trial (see, e.g., Hazeltine, Lightman, Schwarb, & 
Schumacher, 2011) and proactive control before a trial 
are also rule dependent. Thus, one could argue that rules 
are at the core of executive control. In this section, we 
will explore how rules are activated and maintained. We 
make an explicit distinction between a task goal and a 
task rule: A task goal describes what one tries to achieve, 
whereas a task rule specifies how one can achieve it. A 
goal will activate a rule (or set of rules). We will focus 
primarily on the role of task rules.
Learning from instructions
A key characteristic of adaptive human behavior is the 
ability to rapidly learn action rules from instructions. For 
example, if instructed to tap your right foot whenever 
you see the symbol x on this page, most likely you will 
be able to do this without any practice (even though you 
have probably never done this specific task in your life). 
Recently, several studies have focused on the cognitive 
and neural mechanisms underlying this fundamental 
ability. For a complete overview of this instruction-based 
learning literature, we direct the interested reader to two 
recent review articles (Cole, Laurent, & Stocco, 2013; 
Wolfensteller & Ruge, 2012; see also Oberauer, 2009, 
who addresses the issue of language in rule learning and 
control). Cole et al. (2013) proposed the compositional 
account of instruction-based learning. Their account is 
based on five related principles: (a) compositionality, 
which refers to the ability to reuse representations with a 
variety of other representations; (b) immediate transfer, 
which refers to the ability to apply practiced rules to 
novel situations; (c) abstraction, which refers to the abil-
ity to group specific representations; (d) analogy, which 
refers to the ability to recognize similarities; and (e) com-
positional hierarchy, which refers to creating a structure 
in which more abstract representations modulate more 
concrete stimulus–action representations. Of these five 
principles, compositionality is key, as this can offer an 
elegant explanation for our remarkable ability to immedi-
ately perform tasks that we have never done before. 
Returning to the foot-tapping example, you may never 
have tapped your foot when you saw an x on a page, but 
you may have tapped your foot in response to other cues 
(e.g., music), and you may have searched for a specific 
word or letter string in a text before; by linking these 
representations, you are able to perform the new x-tapping 
task. In other words, you would reuse and recombine 
existing circuits, structures, or representations (see also 
Anderson, 2010). Support for the compositional theory 
 by guest on October 2, 2014pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
508 Verbruggen et al.
and other relevant findings are discussed in Cole et al. 
(2013).
There are large individual differences in the ability to 
follow new task rules. The ability may be linked to fluid 
intelligence (Duncan, Schramm, Thompson, & 
Dumontheil, 2012). Furthermore, patients with lesions to 
the lateral prefrontal cortex may not always be able to 
produce the instructed behavior even though they can 
understand the instructions (Cole et al., 2013). Duncan 
and colleagues (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & 
Freer, 1996; Duncan, Johnson, Swales, & Freer, 1997) 
have referred to this phenomenon as goal neglect. Verbal 
instructions specify an abstract requirement (e.g., “if x, 
then tap right foot”), but these requirements have to be 
implemented or transferred to procedural working mem-
ory (Duncan et  al., 2012; Logan & Gordon, 2001; 
Oberauer, 2009). For example, relevant stimulus informa-
tion, response options, and output modalities should 
become biased, and contexts in which the rules are rel-
evant specified. A failure to do so would lead to goal 
neglect (Duncan et al., 1996; Duncan et al., 1997).
Maintenance and retrieval of task 
rules
When instructions are successfully implemented, rules 
have to be maintained. We have argued above that there 
is sustained activity in brain areas that process task- 
relevant information, which biases the selection of infor-
mation. Rules likely provide the top-down signal for this 
bias (E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Stokes & Duncan, 2013). 
The popular account is that rules are maintained in work-
ing memory via persistent firing of stimulus-specific neu-
rons in the prefrontal cortex (Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003). 
More generally, this persistent firing would allow tempo-
ral integration of information, which is required for many 
functions, including working memory and the calculation 
of reward rate (Curtis & Lee, 2010). However, recent find-
ings challenge this persistent activation account (Postle, 
2013; Stokes & Duncan, 2013). For example, Stokes and 
colleagues (2013) showed that the presentation of an 
instruction cue triggers a sequence of high-activity pat-
terns before settling into a stable low-activity state. They 
proposed that, rather than sustained activity, synaptic 
weight changes constitute the task-dependent rules that 
determine how people respond to stimuli (Stokes & 
Duncan, 2013). One of the main challenges is to further 
determine how rules are maintained in long-term and 
short-term memory.
In many situations, people also have to switch between 
rules. This fundamental ability is studied in the task-
switching paradigm (for reviews, see Kiesel et al., 2010; 
Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 
2010). Switching from one rule to another is usually 
associated with a performance cost. Most agree that this 
switch cost reflects the time needed to encode the task 
cues, activate the appropriate task rules, and resolve inter-
ference caused by previous trials, although the extent to 
which each process contributes to the overall switch cost 
may vary. Cue encoding and task reconfiguration are time- 
consuming processes, so performance generally improves 
when these processes can be completed before the stimu-
lus appears (Logan & Gordon, 2001; Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; 
Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). This demonstrates 
the close link between preparation and rule activation and 
maintenance. However, not everybody agrees that people 
always have to switch or update rules when tasks change. 
Logan and colleagues argued that switching between tasks 
could be achieved via the retrieval of learned associations 
among cues, stimuli, and responses (Logan & Bundesen, 
2003; Schneider & Logan, 2005), although this idea remains 
highly controversial (e.g. Forrest, Elchlepp, Monsell, & 
McLaren, 2012; Jost, Mayr, & Rösler, 2008; Monsell & 
Mizon, 2006). In other words, they argued that “control” 
could be associatively mediated.
Interim key points
x In our framework, rules constrain performance by 
providing a top-down bias for each process.
x We argue that the ability to follow novel instruc-
tions and implement new rules is strongly rooted in 
the past: Humans constantly reuse and recombine 
old rules that have previously governed behavior.
Action Control as an Associatively 
Learned Reflex
Historically, executive control has been pitted against 
automatic operations. Often, functions such as response 
inhibition, interference control, or task switching have 
been classified as “executive,” whereas other processes, 
such as word reading in the context of a Stroop task, 
have been classified as “automatic.” In this section, we 
discuss how executive processes may also become auto-
matic as a consequence of practice.
Automaticity and associative learning
It is well documented that responding to a stimulus or 
cue can become automatized over practice (Dickinson, 
1985; Logan, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). Shiffrin and Schneider proposed that 
when a stimulus and a response are consistently mapped, 
associations are formed, allowing actions to become 
automatic (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). Similarly, Logan (1988) suggested that 
every time people respond to a stimulus, 
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processing episodes are stored. These episodes consist of 
the stimulus (e.g., “3”), the interpretation given to a stim-
ulus (e.g., “odd”), the task goal (“odd/even task”), and 
the response (“left”), all of which are stored. When the 
stimulus is repeated, previous processing episodes are 
retrieved, facilitating performance if the stimulus–
response (S-R) mapping is consistent. Recently, research-
ers from our team have demonstrated that more complex 
forms of action control could also become automatized. 
We found that pairing a stimulus with stopping interfered 
with responding to these stimuli (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008a), even after a single stop presentation (Verbruggen 
& Logan, 2008b; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & 
Vandierendonck, 2008). We attributed the behavioral 
slowing for old stop items to the retrieval of stimulus–
stop associations, which would automatically suppress 
responding. Similar associatively mediated “control” 
effects have been observed in other executive control 
tasks. The task-switching literature suggests that stimuli 
can become associated with tasks or rules (Koch & 
Allport, 2006; Mayr & Bryck, 2005; Waszak, Hommel, & 
Allport, 2003). For example, the results of Mayr and Bryck 
(2005) suggested that abstract spatial translation rules can 
become integrated with lower level stimulus and response 
codes; similarly, the results of Waszak and colleagues 
suggested that individual stimuli can become associated 
with higher order task representations, such as picture 
naming (Waszak et al., 2003). Finally, several studies have 
shown that stimuli in tasks such as the Stroop paradigm 
can become associated with attentional control settings 
(Bugg & Crump, 2012). On the basis of these findings, we 
argue that rule-based action control can also become a 
learned reflex, triggered even when it is not required or 
intended at a given moment (cf. Meiran et  al., 2012; 
Tzelgov, 1997; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a)
Associative influences on action 
control
We suggest that there are four nonmutually exclusive 
ways that associative learning could influence action 
control: (a) conditioned attention toward (or away from) 
the cues, (b) associatively mediated activation of previ-
ously nondominant responses, (c) associatively medi-
ated activation of abstract rule representations, and 
(d) by changing the hedonic and/or incentive value of 
stimuli.
First, associative learning could influence attentional 
selection. For example, Le Pelley, Beesley, and Griffiths 
(2011) have found that subjects looked more at cues 
experienced as predictive of the outcomes with which 
they were paired than to cues experienced as nonpredic-
tive. Similarly, Gottlieb and Balan (2010) reviewed a sin-
gle-cell recording study that showed higher sustained 
lateral intraparietal area activation for predictive cues in a 
Pavlovian task and suggested that attentional selection is 
influenced by the information value of the stimuli. These 
results are consistent with the attentional model of asso-
ciative learning proposed by Mackintosh (Mackintosh, 
1975; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). However, Hogarth 
and colleagues (Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown, & 
Duka, 2008) have found that participants looked more at 
partially predictive signals in some situations, which is 
consistent with the Pearce–Hall model of Pavlovian learn-
ing (Pearce & Hall, 1980; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). 
Even though there is uncertainty about the direction of 
the effects, it is clear that attention and associative learn-
ing can interact (albeit in various ways), and the model 
of Mackintosh and Pearce integrates earlier accounts to 
reflect this (Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). In other words, 
attention can become conditioned (McLaren, Wills, & 
Graham, 2010): Attention is paid to stimuli as a conse-
quence of past associative history, rather than because of 
their match with current goals. This is also supported by 
some event-related potential (ERP) studies. For example, 
Wills and colleagues have demonstrated that early atten-
tional components were modulated by associative learn-
ing (Wills, Lavric, Croft, & Hodgson, 2007). In a similar 
vein, ERP work reviewed by Woodman suggests that top-
down biasing of visual attention is required only when 
targets are new, with long-term memory taking over 
when objects are repeated (Woodman, 2013).
Second, a nonhabitual response could become habit-
ual after sufficient practice (Dickinson, 1985; Logan, 
1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977). This would further reduce the need for top-down 
biasing; after sufficient practice, the need for top-down 
biasing may even disappear altogether, and people would 
no longer have to rely on rules or prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
representations to execute an action that was initially 
nondominant. This idea is supported by the work dis-
cussed above and by the finding that neural activation in 
prefrontal and other control-related brain regions is 
reduced after practice with consistent mappings (Chein 
& Schneider, 2005).
Third, the studies discussed above suggest that during 
practice, stimuli can become associated with task goals 
or the task rules that bias attentional or action selection. 
After practice, the goal or rule representations may 
become activated when a stimulus is repeated, whether 
this is intended or not; this would then influence subor-
dinate processing. The stimulus-rule association idea 
could explain why repeating an old stop stimulus acti-
vates components of the stopping network in the ventro-
lateral prefrontal cortex (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, Logan, 
& Poldrack, 2011) or why naming the word inside a 
 picture–word Stroop stimulus is impaired when this stim-
ulus was previously encountered in a picture-naming 
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task (Waszak et al., 2003). Note that such stimulus-task 
effects were observed even when the response (e.g., a 
left key press) was the same in both tasks (Koch & 
Allport, 2006; Waszak et al., 2003). The main difference 
from the previous two options is that this third option 
assumes that rule-like representations that bias ongoing 
selection processes are still involved. In other words, this 
third option provides a more indirect route to associative 
control of action. However, a possible advantage of this 
route is that this form of learning might generalize better 
to novel situations. We are currently testing this idea in 
our lab. Note that in the associative-learning literature, 
there is an ongoing debate as to whether learning asso-
ciations between a stimulus and an action is based on 
rules or on the formation of specific S-R associations (see, 
e.g., McLaren et  al., 2013; Mitchell, De Houwer, & 
Lovibond, 2009). Even though this is speculative, one 
could hypothesize that in our framework, similar learning 
mechanisms underlie rule-based behavior and S-R link-
based behavior. The main difference between the two is 
the kind of representation that is linked with the stimu-
lus: an abstract, rule-like representation (x–“if x, then 
left”), or more concrete S-R associations (x–left).
Finally, stimulus-specific learning may also have a 
more indirect impact on action control via a link with the 
outcome-evaluation processes discussed above. Veling, 
Holland, and van Knippenberg (2008) have shown that 
consistently pairing stimuli with the act of withholding a 
response results in devaluation of stimuli that were ini-
tially rated as positive. Similar devaluation effects have 
been observed in other studies (for a short overview, see 
Ferrey, Frischen, & Fenske, 2012; Kiss, Raymond, Westoby, 
Nobre, & Eimer, 2008). Furthermore, no-go training can-
not only reduce the subjective hedonic value of erotic 
images; it may also reduce the motivational incentive of 
such stimuli. Ferrey et al. (2012) found that participants 
were less willing to invest time and effort (measured by 
the number of key presses participants were willing to 
execute) to view images similar to the ones paired with 
no-go cues. The link between associative learning and 
value is also supported by research in the animal learn-
ing literature (for a recent overview, see McLaren & 
Verbruggen, in press). Furthermore, learning stimulus–go 
associations happens faster in a reward condition than in 
a punishment condition; by contrast, stimulus/no-go 
associations are learned faster in the punishment condi-
tion (Cavanagh, Eisenberg, Guitart-Masip, Huys, & Frank, 
2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). Thus, there may be a 
“hardwired” Pavlovian bias that couples reward with 
approach (“go”) and punishment with avoidance (“no-
go”) (Cavanagh et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). 
Note that the value of items could also be modulated 
associatively via associations between stimuli. Wimmer 
and Shohamy (2012) demonstrated that the delivery of 
reward for a specific item can spread to associated items 
stored in long-term memory. In other words, the value of 
unrewarded items was modulated via associations with 
rewarded items. This phenomenon could explain how 
people can quickly decide between items that they have 
never seen before.
In combination, the work above suggests how chang-
ing behavior can become automatized. However, work 
on extinction learning indicates that some associatively 
mediated forms of action control may be context depen-
dent (in contrast to rule-based action control, which 
seems context independent). In Pavlovian learning, 
extinction occurs when a stimulus that was originally 
paired with an event is repeatedly presented alone; in 
instrumental learning, extinction occurs when an action 
that was originally paired with a reward is no longer rein-
forced. In both cases, learned behavior typically declines, 
but the originally learned behavior often returns when 
the context changes (Bouton & Woods, 2008). This sug-
gests that extinction learning is context dependent. Thus, 
even though automatization may lead to more efficient 
action control, it does come with certain limitations.
Interim key points
x Action control can become a “learned” reflex: 
Replacing dominant actions initially requires top-
down bias but could gradually become automa-
tized, with the need for top-down bias disappearing 
altogether.
x Associative learning can influence action control 
by modulating each processing step in our frame-
work (i.e., signal detection, action selection, action 
execution).
x We hypothesize that similar learning mechanisms 
underlie both rule-based and S-R link-based 
behavior.
Development of an Action Control 
Network
We argued above that a key characteristic of flexible 
human behavior is the ability to implement new rules 
quickly, and we proposed that this feat can be achieved 
by reusing or recombining existing representations or 
rules (i.e., the compositionality idea). But in our quest to 
abolish the control homunculus from theories of action 
control, we need to address one final issue: How does 
the control repertoire, or the set of basic rules and control 
processes, initially develop?
Learning of rules and abstract 
representations
Little research has been done on how rules for complex 
actions are initially acquired (Collins & Frank, 2013). 
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Basic reinforcement learning accounts can explain how 
people acquire simple stimulus–action rules. A central 
assumption of these accounts is that simple rules are 
learned via exploration of the environment: When a stim-
ulus is presented, one can try different courses of action 
(e.g., pressing a button on a new piece of equipment) 
and subsequently monitor the outcome of the chosen 
actions. Each time a particular action in response to the 
presentation of a stimulus leads to a positive outcome, 
the strength of the action increases, and eventually, sim-
ple rule-like structures develop. As argued above, stimuli 
and responses can also become paired via error-driven 
and Hebbian associative learning mechanisms. Error-
correction learning mechanisms try to reduce the dis-
crepancy between the predicted outcome and the actual 
outcome (McLaren et al., 2013), whereas Hebb’s learning 
rule states that “cells that fire together bind together.” 
However, basic reinforcement and associative learning 
accounts struggle to explain more complex goal-directed 
behavior in environments in which multiple stimuli or 
stimulus features (e.g., color or shape) can be attended to 
and in which many actions can be selected.
One of the harder questions in psychology is how, 
starting with a set of basic associative- or reinforcement-
learning processes, it might be possible to deploy them 
so as to arrive at a system capable of propositional rea-
soning. In other words, how can we go from associa-
tions to rules? There have been some successful attempts 
to integrate basic learning and rule acquisition. For 
example, Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, and O’Reilly 
(2005) developed a neurologically inspired computa-
tional model of rule learning. The model was trained to 
respond to multidimensional stimuli. In each block, only 
one dimension was relevant (e.g., color). Across trials, 
the specific features within a dimension changed (e.g., 
red, green, yellow), but activity in the prefrontal cortex 
was maintained because of a gating mechanism (Hazy, 
Frank, & O’Reilly, 2007). As a result, the PFC system 
developed patterns of activity that encoded abstract rep-
resentations of the relevant stimulus dimension (e.g., 
“color”). These abstract rule-like representations subse-
quently guided behavior by providing “top-down” excit-
atory support for the relevant stimulus dimension in the 
subordinate processing levels (cf. biased competition). 
The biasing was possible because links between the 
abstract representations and the processing layers were 
built during training. Thus, the model produced flexible 
rule-like behavior without “biologically problematic sym-
bolic processing computations” (Rougier et al., 2005, p. 
7343). After sufficient training, the model was also able to 
respond correctly to stimuli it had not seen before. This 
generalization correlated strongly with development of 
abstract representations. By contrast, models without the 
PFC system, such as the associative simple recurrent 
network model (Elman, 1990), had to learn specific S-R 
combinations, and these did not generalize well to novel 
situations.
The latter result is consistent with the findings of 
Spiegel and McLaren (2006). Humans and the recurrent 
network model were trained on a task in which they had 
to respond to the location of circles on a computer 
screen. In the experimental group, trial sequences always 
had a specific structure (e.g., ABB[varying numbers of Cs]
BBA; the letters represent three possible locations of the 
circles). Over a series of experiments, it was demon-
strated that the network model used all the structure 
available to develop simple rule-like representations. 
This resulted in faster and more accurate responses. 
These representations allowed some generalization to 
novel situations (hence, they were rule-like). However, 
generalization was imperfect because the model was 
sensitive to seemingly inconsequential departures from 
the initial structure. This was very similar to the behavior 
of humans in these experiments when they were unaware 
of the contingencies in play. However, under some con-
ditions, humans were able to induce the rule as pro-
grammed by the experimenters (e.g., “always as many Bs 
before as after the Cs”), and in these instances generaliza-
tion was near perfect. The recurrent network model was 
never able to do this. This suggests that rule learning in 
humans comes about as the result of a more complex 
system with many interacting parts. Nevertheless, the 
finding that a simple associative network is able to 
develop basic rules (albeit imperfectly) further supports 
the idea that basic associative or reinforcement mecha-
nisms may indeed underlie rule learning. Consistent with 
this, Ramamoorthy and Verguts (2012) recently devel-
oped a computational model of instruction following that 
relied on basic Hebbian learning processes in prefrontal 
cortex (see also Deco & Rolls, 2005).
If we assume that we begin with reward- or error-
driven associative learning processes, then we believe 
that in order to be capable of developing rule-like repre-
sentations, these processes will need to be embedded in 
an architecture that must, at a minimum, be complex (by 
which we mean multilayer or more than one layer of 
weights), nonlinear (so that the multiple layers are not 
simply equivalent to a single layer; see Minsky & Parert, 
1969), and recursive (so that the system can, in principle, 
compute any computable function). Obviously, the learn-
ing algorithm used will have to be capable of operating 
within this framework (for an example of such an algo-
rithm, see Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986). In 
essence, then, we propose that associative processes 
within a sufficiently rich and complex architecture can 
deliver the possibility of rule-based (symbolic) computa-
tion. But even if all these requirements are met, there is 
still much to be done. It will be the interaction of that 
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system with the world that will allow this development to 
take place. The architecture and learning algorithms, 
which have evolved throughout human evolution, merely 
confer the potential for rule-based processing; the poten-
tial has to be realized in the course of experience, and so 
the transition from association to cognition is also a 
developmental issue.
In sum, we believe that a key to behavioral flexibility is 
the development of abstract representations via basic 
learning mechanisms. These representations will guide or 
contextualize stimulus detection, action selection, and 
action execution (Badre, Kayser, & D’Esposito, 2010; 
Collins & Frank, 2013; see also, e.g., Frank & Badre, 2012) 
and allow generalization to novel situations (see also 
Forrest et al., 2012). Even though these models were used 
to simulate relatively straightforward rule-based behavior, 
the general principles are likely to apply to more complex 
situations (Rougier et al., 2005). In complex environments, 
the agent may make temporal abstractions: grouping 
together a set of interrelated actions (options or policies) 
(Botvinick, 2012; Botvinick et  al., 2009). These policies 
can be learned and selected via the same reinforcement-
based learning mechanisms discussed above. When a 
policy is selected (e.g., making coffee), the more “primi-
tive” motor actions are produced based on the acquired 
lower level stimulus–action associations (see Botvinick, 
2012, for an accessible discussion).
Development: Building a network for 
the future
Major changes in rule-based action control take place 
during childhood. Indeed, the ability of children to regu-
late their behavior improves remarkably from infancy 
through adolescence (for recent reviews, see Bunge & 
Crone, 2009; Bunge, Mackey, & Whitaker, 2009; Diamond, 
2013). Such changes have been linked to development of 
executive control functions and the protracted develop-
ment of the prefrontal control network (Bunge & O’Hare, 
2012).
Developmental changes in rule-based action control 
throughout early and late development can be linked to 
a shift from concrete stimulus–action associations to 
abstract rule-like representations (Bunge & Zelazo, 2006; 
Munakata et  al., 2012). Initially, young children would 
learn simple stimulus–action associations via exploration 
(“if I push this button, a light turns on”), automatic imita-
tion, or deliberate demonstration by others. These asso-
ciations then become the building blocks for the 
rule-based control network and shape the development 
of more abstract representations that constrain and regu-
late other ongoing processes. Indeed, Rougier et  al. 
(2005) found that concrete S-R representations (in poste-
rior brain systems) had to stabilize before abstract rule-
like representations could be extracted.
Several studies support the transition account. For 
example, young children are influenced more by specific 
S-R associations than adults when switching between 
tasks (Crone, Bunge, van der Molen, & Ridderinkhof, 
2006). Furthermore, Kharitonova and Munakata (2011) 
have demonstrated that in 3-year-old children, flexible 
rule use in a card-sorting test correlated with perfor-
mance in an abstraction test that required children to 
select the odd-one-out on the basis of an overarching 
category. They suggested that this link could be explained 
by a common underlying working memory mechanism 
that supports rule-like abstraction and perceptually based 
abstraction (see also Collins & Frank, 2013). In other 
words, abstraction underlies flexibility.
In addition to changes in the ability to develop abstract 
rule-like representations, children may also develop an 
ability to generate temporal abstractions. Botvinick et al. 
(2009) noted that throughout development, action con-
trol becomes more hierarchical, with simple actions or 
rules becoming integrated within larger wholes or struc-
tures. Similarly, Bunge and Zelazo (2006) reviewed a 
series of studies suggesting that development of cogni-
tive control was associated with an increased ability to 
represent hierarchies of rules in which higher-order rules 
(cf. “policies”) operate on lower order rules.
To conclude, Thompson-Schill, Ramscar, and 
Chrysikou (2009) proposed that protracted development 
of the executive prefrontal network is necessary to allow 
children to learn linguistic and social conventions. Here 
we propose that learning necessarily precedes executive 
control because learning has to provide the building 
blocks for a control repertoire based on abstraction first.
Interim key points
x Our framework places learning of increasingly 
abstract representations at the heart of executive 
control.
x Only through constant interaction with their envi-
ronment can people build up a control repertoire 
that will underlie all forms of rule-based behavior.
x This repertoire continues to develop throughout 
the life span.
Implications for Behavioral Change
Clinical disorders often have many origins; alterations of 
cognitive processes may be one of them. Therefore, we 
believe that our framework can be applied in clinical 
domains to increase our understanding of certain control 
deficits and provide a theoretical basis for the develop-
ment of novel behavioral change interventions.
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Just as in the cognitive and neuroscience domain, attri-
bution of control to convenient control homunculi is still 
very present in the clinical and more applied domains. 
Most clinical and neurobiological models that rely on 
executive control lack a precise description of the under-
lying cognitive components and mechanisms. We have 
argued that a failure to change behavior could have mul-
tiple origins. Thus, merely describing a deficit or phe-
nomenon as a deficit of “inhibition” or “executive control” 
does not provide an explanation and discourages discus-
sion of alternative theories. For instance, poor stopping 
performance in adults with ADHD may be partly due to 
inattention (Bekker et  al., 2005). Many studies have 
observed stopping deficits in children and adults with 
ADHD, which has led researchers to suggest that poor 
response inhibition is central to their deficit (Lijffijt, 
Kenemans, Verbaten, & van Engeland, 2005; Lipszyc & 
Schachar, 2010; Nigg, 2001). However, Bekker et  al. 
(2005) found using ERPs that an early attention-related 
component (the N1, which is a negative-going ERP com-
ponent observed 80–120 ms after the presentation of an 
auditory stop signal) was larger for successful stop trials 
than for unsuccessful stop trials in the control group. This 
finding suggests that perceptual attention contributes to 
stopping. This difference in N1 was absent in adults with 
ADHD, which suggests that stopping deficits in adults 
with ADHD are due not entirely to deficiencies in inhibi-
tion but also to deficiencies in stimulus detection. 
Similarly, J. W. Brown and Braver (2008) have argued that 
the failure to suppress risky and inappropriate behavior 
in addictions could stem from a failure to adjust perfor-
mance after learning (for a similar idea, see Garavan & 
Stout, 2005). These studies indicate that focusing on basic 
processes provides a more detailed account of control 
deficits in, for example, behavioral and substance addic-
tions. This may lead not only to important new insights 
in the etiology of various disorders characterized as defi-
cits in changing behavior but also to the development of 
strategies for treating these conditions. Indeed, a com-
mon critique is that the effective mechanisms of most 
behavioral treatments are still underspecified (Toneatto & 
Ladoceur, 2003). Therefore, providing a detailed account 
of action control deficits could stimulate the develop-
ment of new theory-driven behavioral treatments. For 
example, it could lead to personalized interventions: 
Person A and Person B may both have stopping deficits 
with different origins, so the intervention for Person A 
could, for example, focus on biasing attention (e.g., in 
adults with ADHD; see Bekker et al., 2005), whereas the 
intervention for Person B could focus on performance 
monitoring and control adjustments (e.g., in substance 
abusers; see Garavan & Stout, 2005).
The work on proactive control suggests that prepara-
tion could lead to a prepared reflex, making 
action control less susceptible to the negative effects of 
concurrent load (Logan, 1978). This is consistent with 
findings in the implementation intention literature 
(Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer, Gawrilow, & Oettingen, 
2010; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). Implementation inten-
tions refer to the linking of critical situations or cues to 
specific actions (e.g., “Whenever I see a red light on a 
food item, I will not buy it”). This could lead to a pre-
pared reflex; indeed, Gollwitzer noted that after imple-
mentation intentions are formed, “action initiation 
becomes swift, efficient, and does not require conscious 
intent” (Gollwitzer, 1999, p. 495). Others have argued that 
forming implementation intentions leads to increased 
monitoring for cues (see Rummel, Einstein, & Rampey, 
2012, for a discussion), but this is still consistent with the 
proactive control idea discussed above. It is important to 
note that implementation intentions, and consequently 
proactive control, could have a positive impact on behav-
ior (Gollwitzer et al., 2010; Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). 
For example, they may reduce the negative impact of 
stress on rule-based action control (Scholz et al., 2009), 
presumably because less reactive control is required. 
They may also strengthen the effects of commercial 
weight loss programs (Luszczynska, Sobczyk, & Abraham, 
2007) and reduce binge drinking (Hagger et al., 2012). 
Thus, an avenue for future research is how proactive 
control can be used in treatments, bearing in mind that 
there are certain costs associated with it (as discussed 
above).
It is also important to understand how people develop 
and use new rules. For example, supermarkets in the 
United Kingdom recently started using a traffic-light 
labeling system to indicate sugar, fat, salt, and calorie 
contents of food items. But how do people use this new 
system to replace their favorite (but unhealthy) food item 
with a more healthy option? The work on rule learning 
and, in particular, generalization and abstraction as dis-
cussed above could provide some clues. For example, it 
suggests that new rules that are based on previously 
acquired rules (e.g., red light = stop) might be learned 
more quickly (and consequently be more effective). The 
ability to form abstract rules may also lead to generaliza-
tion of control across domains. We agree with Munakata 
et al. (2012), among others, that abstraction may explain 
executive-control training effects in children. Executive-
control training may work better in children with low 
self-control than in adults with low self-control (Berkman, 
Graham, & Fisher, 2012). A better understanding of how 
rules are developed would lead to more effective train-
ing. Even though this is highly speculative, building 
abstract rule-like representations may also provide an 
explanation for some more idiosyncratic transfer effects, 
such as the positive effect of avoiding sweets or regularly 
squeezing a handgrip in a 2-week training period on stop 
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performance afterward (Muraven, 2010), the differential 
effect of open versus skilled sports on stopping (C. H. 
Wang et  al., 2013), or other inhibitory spillover effects 
(e.g., Berkman, Burklund, & Lieberman, 2009). As pro-
posed by the compositional account, people may recycle 
or recombine rules that they used in other situations; 
building up a control repertoire in one domain could 
therefore lead to improved performance in other appar-
ently nonrelated domains as long as the acquired repre-
sentations are abstract enough.
Finally, associatively mediated action control could 
open the avenue for new treatments. Several recent stud-
ies have already shown that learning to stop motor 
responses toward food- or alcohol-related stimuli influ-
ences food and alcohol intake both inside and outside 
the lab. For example, several studies have found that con-
sistent pairing of food-related pictures to stopping in a 
go/no-go or stop-signal paradigm reduced subsequent 
food consumption (Houben, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 
2011; Lawrence, Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2014; 
Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 
2012). Furthermore, a similar procedure with alcohol-
related stimuli reduced the hedonic value of alcohol and 
the subsequent weekly alcohol intake of heavy drinking 
students (Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 
2012), whereas Jones and Field found that stimulus- 
specific stop training reduced alcohol intake in the labo-
ratory but not self-reported drinking in the week after 
training ( Jones & Field, 2013). Wiers and colleagues 
found that a similar avoidance training task influenced 
treatment outcomes in alcoholics a year later (Wiers, 
Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011). Finally, 
recent work from our lab suggests that stopping a motor 
response can reduce gambling (Verbruggen, Adams, & 
Chambers, 2012). We are currently exploring the mecha-
nisms behind this transfer, but it is possible that stopping 
generally reduced approach motivation. In combination, 
these results suggest that go/no-go, avoidance, or stop-
signal training can influence approach behavior toward a 
range of stimuli, possibly by changing attitudes toward 
these stimuli or by creating nonrespond (avoid) associa-
tions. People may also associatively learn to direct their 
attention either toward or away from stimuli. Recent 
meta-analyses suggest that attentional-bias modification 
could be used in treatments for anxiety (Hakamata et al., 
2010), although the effect may be more modest than ini-
tially suggested (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). Several studies 
have also examined attentional-bias modification in 
addiction. This could involve training people to redirect 
attention away from drug-related cues toward more neu-
tral cues (Wiers, Gladwin, Hofmann, Salemink, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2013). The effectiveness of this training on 
addiction is still unclear. For example, a single session of 
attentional bias modification did not influence subjective 
craving or behavioral measures of tobacco seeking in 
cigarette smokers (Field, Duka, Tyler, & Schoenmakers, 
2009). Approach–avoidance, go/no-go, or stop-signal 
training may be more effective because several aspects of 
inappropriate behavior can be influenced at the same 
time. Indeed, avoidance or inhibition training could influ-
ence hedonistic value, motivational behavior (approach 
vs. avoidance), and possibly even attention toward the 
stimuli. Data from studies inspired by the framework pre-
sented here suggest that, in some situations, subjects may 
learn associations between the go stimulus and the stop 
signal, enhancing detection of the latter (Verbruggen, 
Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014). However, 
much more research is needed to examine how well vari-
ous forms of inhibitory and executive-control training 
can influence behavior outside the lab (see also Jones, 
Christiansen, Nederkoorn, Houben, & Field, 2013). This 
work will also have to address the context-dependence 
issue (Bouton & Woods, 2008).
Final Thoughts and Conclusions
We have discussed how action control can be attributed 
to the interplay between three basic cognitive pro-
cesses: signal detection, action selection, and action 
execution. These processes are constantly adjusted and 
biased via abstract representations that develop slowly 
but that can be generalized to different contexts. These 
representations support flexible behavior. At the same 
time, more concrete stimulus–action outcome associa-
tions are learned, which can result in automatization of 
actions that were initially regulated by the “executive” 
abstraction-based system. We have attempted to unpack 
each component of our framework. It is possible that 
future research will demonstrate that some components 
or processes may have to be broken down further, 
leading to an even more nested system. We agree with 
Dennett that the only way to “discharge fancy homun-
culi from one’s scheme [is] by organizing armies of such 
idiots to do the work” (quoted in Monsell & Driver, 
2000, p. 7). We believe that in order to understand how 
control is achieved, boxes have to be broken down 
until we understand how complex behavior arises from 
a basic set of cognitive processes that can be imple-
mented by our neural system. One may object against 
this deconstruction idea on the basis of parsimony: A 
model with fewer components may seem more parsi-
monious. However, this parsimony would be achieved 
only by attributing multiple powers to specific control-
lers or control functions (Monsell & Driver, 2000), mak-
ing the seemingly more parsimonious account equally 
complex.
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Relation with other frameworks and 
models
Our framework builds on existing accounts of attention, 
control, working memory, and learning (e.g., Chein & 
Schneider, 2012; Deco & Rolls, 2005; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Logan & Gordon, 2001; E. K. Miller & Cohen, 2001; 
Rougier et al., 2005). Consistent with these accounts, we 
postulate that the main role of the executive control sys-
tem is to bias competition in subordinate processes via 
rules maintained in working memory (either in an active 
or silent mode). But we also propose that once the rules 
are implemented, the control system can take a back seat 
in many, if not most, situations, and action control may 
eventually become automatized. This overall framework 
is consistent with the learning and control framework of 
Chein and Schneider (2012), who proposed that there are 
three systems: a meta-cognitive system, which supports 
rule learning, monitoring, and task sequencing (cf. hierar-
chical control); a cognitive control system, which supports 
attention and action control; and a representation system, 
which supports associative learning. They also suggested 
that through practice, the associative system will take over 
from the metacognitive and control systems, which is con-
sistent with our “learned reflex” idea.
We believe that the main strength of our framework 
is that it integrates various theories and models, links 
findings, and points out similarities and differences 
between domains. This integration is a crucial step to 
enhance understanding of executive control and behav-
ioral change.
Beyond action control
Many principles of our action control framework may 
translate to control in other domains, including emotion 
and control of thought. Several lines of evidence suggest 
a certain overlap between control of action and control of 
thought and emotion. Action control and control of emo-
tion and thought may also be coupled because changes in 
internal states (such as thoughts or an emotional reaction) 
could trigger changes in ongoing actions. Corbetta et al.’s 
(2008) review suggested that the ventral attention net-
work, which is required for action control, might be 
involved in switching between aspects of  “internal” pro-
cessing, such as memory retrieval or self- referential 
thoughts. Furthermore, brain areas that are important for 
action control, such as the right inferior frontal gyrus and 
the right middle frontal gyrus, may also regulate emo-
tional memories (Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007) or 
unwanted thoughts (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Depue, 
Burgess, Willcutt, Ruzic, & Banich, 2010). The overlap 
between action control and emotion regulation is further 
supported by correlations among rumination, inhibition, 
and task switching (Whitmer & Banich, 2007). These and 
other similar findings have led several researchers to pro-
pose that similar control mechanisms may be required to 
regulate various aspects of human behavior (Aron, 
Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Banich et al., 2009; J. R. Cohen 
& Lieberman, 2010). Although speculative, this overlap 
could again be partly due to involvement of the abstract 
rule-like representations in various domains (“do not 
think,” “do not respond,” and so forth). More generally, 
we believe that the main difference between domains 
may be in the content controlled, not in the mechanisms 
by which control is achieved (see also Logan et al., 2014).
The work of Depue, Banich, and others has suggested 
that emotion and executive control may influence each 
other (Depue et al., 2010; Depue et al., 2007; Whitmer & 
Banich, 2007). This link is further discussed by Pessoa 
(2009), who proposed a dual-competition framework to 
account for the effects of low- and high-threat emotional 
information on executive control. This framework can be 
integrated with our action control framework. More spe-
cifically, on the basis of Pessoa’s framework, we hypoth-
esize that emotional content that is low in threat interferes 
primarily with attentional selection; by contrast, high-
threat information would interfere with action selection 
as well. We believe that this highlights one of the major 
benefits of our processing framework: By focusing on the 
specific mechanisms rather than the general functions, a 
richer and more detailed picture emerges.
In a similar vein, one could use our framework to 
examine how motivation, mood, stress, and other state-
dependent factors influence action control and flexible 
behavior. For example, animal studies have shown that 
the prefrontal cortex is modulated by neurotransmitter 
systems mediating stress and arousal (Arnsten, 2009; 
Robbins, 2007). The link between stress and action con-
trol is also demonstrated by the finding that people with 
addictions are prone to failing to suppress drug-seeking 
behavior in stressful situations (Sinha, 2008). We hypoth-
esize that acute stress could influence action control in at 
least three different ways: It could lead to a narrowed 
focus of attention (Chajut & Algom, 2003), it could dis-
courage selection of alternative actions (Goschke, 2000), 
or it could shift the balance between rule-based and 
associatively mediated action control (Schwabe, 
Dickinson, & Wolf, 2011). Given the impact of state-
dependent factors on behavioral change, a better under-
standing of which processes are influenced by factors 
such as stress could lead to the development of new 
interventions and improvements in existing ones.
Conclusion
To conclude, we hope that this article will inspire research 
on action control, behavioral flexibility, and behavioral 
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change to focus more on specific cognitive processes and 
representations, how these can be learned throughout 
development and adulthood, and how these are main-
tained. We believe that this will lead to better models of 
executive control of action and behavioral change, which 
can inspire the development of new and more effective 
theory-driven interventions. Ultimately, this approach 
will allow us to banish homunculi from our theories.
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Notes
1. The accumulation process is analogous to drawing a series of 
balls from a container (Usher & McClelland, 2001). For exam-
ple, the container can hold balls with “left” or “right” written on 
them. At each time step in the response-selection process, a ball 
would be drawn, and a count is added to the appropriate coun-
ter (e.g., when a “left” ball is selected, a count is added to the 
left counter). A response is selected when one of the counters 
reaches a threshold. When the response threshold is 10, then a 
response is selected when 10 “left” balls or 10 “right” balls have 
been drawn from the container.
2. A quasi-experiment was subsequently conducted. The sec-
ond author tested the prepared reflex idea by either signaling 
or not signaling at this junction when a car was waiting to 
turn on another 20 days, signaling on 10 occasions and not 
signaling on 10 occasions in alternation (this took about half a 
year). The results were that on 50% of “signal” occasions, the 
car immediately turned. This never happened on “no-signal” 
occasions.
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